We consider the problem of storing data in a distributed manner over T servers. We require the data (i) to be recoverable from the T servers, and (ii) to remain private from any T − 1 colluding servers, where privacy is quantified in terms of mutual information between the data and all the information available at the T − 1 colluding servers. For this model, we determine (i) the fundamental trade-off between storage size and the level of desired privacy, (ii) the optimal amount of local randomness necessary at the encoder, and (iii) an explicit low-complexity coding scheme that solely relies on XOR operations and that asymptotically (with the data size) matches the fundamental limits found.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure distributed storage schemes, e.g., [1] - [5] , often rely on the idea of secret sharing as introduced in [6] , [7] . Hence, there is a fundamental lower bound on the required storage space necessary to securely store information in a distributed manner. Specifically, in any secret sharing scheme, the total amount of information that needs to be stored must at least be equal to the entropy of the secret times the number of participants, see e.g., [8] , and it is thus impossible to reduce the storage space without any changes to the model assumptions.
To this end, we propose to determine the optimal cost reduction, in terms of storage space, that can be obtained in exchange of tolerating a controlled amount of reduced privacy. This idea is closely related to non-perfect secret sharing [9] , [10] with a non-linear access function. Unfortunately, for large secrets, as required for data storage, no low-complexity coding scheme is known to implement non-perfect secret sharing. However, we note that in the absence of a privacy constraint, a low-complexity secret sharing scheme based on XOR operations has been proposed in [11] .
We aim to fill this void in this paper and focus on a setting where a file F needs to be stored at T servers. The data is intended to be recoverable from these T servers, and needs to remains private from any T − 1 colluding servers. Here, privacy is quantified in terms of mutual information between the data and all the information available at the T −1 colluding servers.
To be concrete, consider the example of three servers, i.e., T = 3, where the mutual information between the data of This work was supported in part by the NSF under grants CCF-1850227 and CNS-1526547. any two servers and the file F must not exceed L 1 4 H(F ). Assuming that F is a sequence of uniformly distributed bits, we split F in four parts (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , F 4 ) of equal length (for simplicity we assume here that |F | is a multiple of four), and we store in the three servers the shares
where (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 , K 5 ) are four sequences of uniformly distributed bits with size |F |/4, ⊕ denotes the XOR operation, and denotes concatenation. We remark that all the four parts (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , F 4 ) are either stored in clear or encrypted through a one-time pad. By inspection, one easily sees in this example that F can be recovered from (M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) and any two shares leak at most 1 4 H(F ) bits about F . As it will be shown in the following, the size of the shares is optimal as well as the amount of local randomness, i.e., the length of (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 , K 5 ).
Our main contribution is the design of a low-complexity coding scheme for this problem with arbitrary parameters L and T that solely relies on XOR operations and that is asymptotically (with file size) optimal in terms of data storage and the required amount of local randomness at the encoder.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We formalize the problem in Section II and state our main results in Section III. Our coding scheme is presented in Section IV. We present the proofs of our results in the appendix. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section V. 
II. PROBLEM
, which takes as input the file F to store and a sequence R of bits uniformly distributed over {0, 1} ρ and independent of F , and outputs T sequences (referred to as shares in the following)
which takes as input all the T sequences stored at the servers, and outputs an estimate F of the file F .
where we have used the notation M S (M t ) t∈S , ∀S T .
The objective is to design L-private (λ, ρ) coding schemes with minimal storage size requirement, i.e., minimal λ, and minimal amount of local randomness requirement at the encoder, i.e., minimal ρ.
Theorem 1 (Minimal storage size requirement). For any Lprivate (λ, ρ) coding scheme, we have
Theorem 2 (Minimal local randomness requirement). For any L-private (λ, ρ) coding scheme, we have
Theorem 3 (Achievability). Assume that α = 0 or α = l k , for some k, l ∈ N * with k and l coprime. By density of Q in R, such an α can be chosen arbitrarily close to any point in [0, 1]. The coding scheme in Section IV is an L-private (λ, ρ) coding scheme with
where
IV. CODING SCHEME
Consider α ∈ [0, 1] such that α = 0 or α = l k , for some k, l ∈ N * with k and l coprime.
A. Preliminaries
• In the following, one can assume
i.e., lT < k. Indeed, if α 1/T , i.e., L H(F )/T , then the privacy constraint is trivially satisfied if one splits the file in T parts of size H(F )/T and store one part in each server.
• There exists q ∈ N, r ∈ 0, T − 2 such that
and one can assume
Otherwise, if qT + r = k (one has a similar argument if qT + r > k), then one can split the file F in k parts of equal size and store q + 1 parts of F in the first r servers and q parts of F in the remaining servers. The privacy constraint is satisfied by (6) because any N − 1 servers have at most q(T − 1) + r = l parts of F , and (2) holds.
where we have used (5) , and there exists u ∈ N, v ∈ 1, T − 1 such that
We emphasize that l, k, and T are the only parameters of the coding scheme; q, r, u, and v are obtained as sole functions of l, k, and T .
B. Coding Scheme
Step
and independent of all other random variables. For convenience, we write K i:j
Step 3. We now describe how to design the shares M T . Each share M t , stored in Server t ∈ T , is a vector of (k − l) sequences (labeled from 1 to k − l) of size (H(F ) + β)/k. For convenience, for t ∈ T , and i, j ∈ 1, k − l such that i j, we write M t [i : j] to designate the sequences of M t labeled from i to j, and M t [i] to designate the sequences of M t labeled by i. For t ∈ T , the elements of the vector M t are of one of the following types.
• An unencrypted part of F , i.e., an element of
• An encrypted part of F , obtained by XORing a part of F with one or several keys. To precisely describe how the shares M T are chosen we distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Assume that r + v < T . The unencrypted parts of F and keys are assigned according to Algorithms 1, 2, respectively. The encrypted parts of F are defined and assigned according to Algorithm 4. Note that we have the following.
unencrypted parts of F , u keys, and
encrypted parts of F .
• For t ∈ r + 1, T − v , M t consists of k − l sequences: q unencrypted parts of F , u keys, and x + 1 encrypted parts of F .
q unencrypted parts of F , u + 1 keys, and x encrypted parts of F .
Case 2. Assume that r + v T . The unencrypted parts of F and keys are assigned according to Algorithms 1, 3, respectively. The encrypted parts of F are defined and assigned according to Algorithm 5. Note that we have the following.
unencrypted parts of F , u keys, and x encrypted parts of F .
q + 1 unencrypted parts of F , u + 1 keys, and x − 1 encrypted parts of F . • For t ∈ r + 1, T , M t consists of k − l sequences: q unencrypted parts of F , u + 1 keys, and x encrypted parts of F . (7) . In Case 2, we also have have x 0, otherwise k−r−T q = N Encrypted = (T −v+T −r)x+(r−T +v)(x−1) < 0, which again contradicts (7) . Remark 2. In both cases, the first N Plain qT + r parts (F i ) i∈ 1,qT +r are stored unencrypted in the servers, and the N Encrypted k − r − T q (> 0 by (7)) remaining parts (F i ) i∈ qT +r+1,k are first encrypted using the keys (K i ) i∈ 1,T (k−l)−k before being stored in the servers. (3, 10) . By (6), we have (q, r) = (1, 1) and by (8) , we have (u, v) = (3, 2). We have r + v = T , so we are in Case 2. Moreover, N Keys = 11, N Plain = 4, N Encrypted = 6, x = 2. After running Algorithms 1 and 3, we have if t T − v then 3:
else if t > r then 7:
After running Algorithm 5, we obtain the encrypted parts of the file F as
Example 2 (T = 5, L = 7H(F )/11). Define α 7 11 , i.e, (l, k) (7, 11) . By (6), we have (q, r) = (1, 3) and by (8) , we have (u, v) = (1, 4) . We have r + v > T , so we are in Case 2. Moreover, N Keys = 9, N Plain = 8, N Encrypted = 3, x = 1. After running Algorithms 1 and 3 we have
Algorithm 4 Creation and assignment of encrypted parts when r + v < T Inputs: File F and keys (K i ) i∈ 1,N keys 1: for i ∈ 1, x + 1 do 2:
for t ∈ T do 3: if t r then 4: j N Plain + (t − 1)x + i 5:
else if t > T − v then 10:
For t ′ ∈ T \{t}, choose the key K a with the smallest a ∈ I t ′ , which has not previously been chosen in this algorithm, among the keys stored in Server t ′ , and define κ t ′ K a . If this is not possible, then define κ t ′ = 0. 
14:
else if t > r then 10:
if z = ∅ then 14:
For t ′ ∈ T \{t}, choose the key K a with the smallest a ∈ I t ′ , which has not previously been chosen in this algorithm, and define κ t ′ K a . If this is not possible, then define κ t ′ = 0.
15:
Define M t [z] F j ⊕ t ′ ∈T \{t} κ t ′
16:
end if 17: end for 18: end for where after running Algorithm 5 the encrypted parts of F are fixed as
where (a) holds by (1), (b) holds by (2), (c) holds by definition of α.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For any L-private (λ, ρ) coding scheme, we have
where (a) holds by uniformity of R, (b) holds by independence between F and R, (c) holds because M T is a deterministic function of (R, F ), (d) holds by the chain rule, (e) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, (f ) holds by the proof of Theorem 1, (g) holds by definition of α.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We will use the following definition in our analysis of the coding scheme of Section IV. By construction, it is straightforward to verify that the storage size in (3) and the required amount of local randomness at the encoder in (4) are satisfied. Next, decodability (1) holds because all the parts (F i ) i∈ 1,k of F are stored in M T : N Plain parts are unencrypted and the N Encrypted encrypted parts can be decrypted from modulo-2 addition with keys that are all stored in M T . Finally, it is sufficient to prove that the privacy constraint in (2) holds for all the subsets of T with size T − 1,
We will thus prove that (2) holds for the sets S t T \{t}, t ∈ T . We first define K St , F St , and E St as all the keys, unencrypted parts of F , and encrypted parts of F , respectively, stored in the servers in S t . We next consider two cases.
where (a) holds by (9), (b) holds by (6) and (8) . We next consider three cases depending on the value of t ∈ T .
• Assume t r. We have
where (a) holds for some j ∈ N Plain + 1, k and (s(i)) i∈It ∈ N Plain + 1, k |It| as follows. Note indeed that Server t stores |I t |= u keys and all the other severs store (r − 1)x + (T − v − r)(x + 1) + vx = u + 1 (by (11)) encrypted parts of F , hence, considering the encrypted parts E St of all the servers in S t , all but one are protected by a key of Server t by Line 14 of Algorithm 4.
(b) holds because K St is independent of F , (c) holds by the chain rule and because (K St , (F i ) i∈ 1,k \{s(i):i∈It} ) is independent from (F s(i) , F s(i) ⊕ K i ) i∈It , (d) holds because |S t |= (r − 1)(q + 1) + (T − r)q = l − 1 by (6), (e) holds by the one-time pad [12] . • Assume r + 1 t T − v. We have
where (a) holds for some (s(i)) i∈It ∈ N Plain + 1, k |It| as follows. Note indeed that Server t stores |I t |= u keys, and all the other severs store rx+(T −v −r −1)(x+1)+ vx = u (by (11)) encrypted parts of F . Hence, all the encrypted parts E St of all the servers in S t are protected by a key of Server t by Line 14 of Algorithm 4. (b) holds similar to (13) because |S t |= r(q + 1) + (T − r − 1)q = l by (6).
• Assume t T − v + 1. The proof of (13) is identical to Subcase ii by remarking that (i) Server t stores |I t |= u keys, and all the other severs store rx (11)) encrypted parts of F , and (ii)|S t |= r(q + 1) + (T − r − 1)q = l by (6).
B. Case 2. r + v T
Remark that
where the last equality holds by (11) . We next consider three cases depending on the value of t ∈ T .
• Assume t T − v. We have
where (a) holds for some j ∈ N Plain + 1, k and (s(i)) i∈It ∈ N Plain + 1, k |It| as follows. Note indeed that Server t stores |I t |= u keys and all the other severs store (T −v −1)x+(r −T +v)(x−1)+(T −r)x = u+1 (by (14)) encrypted parts of F , hence, considering the encrypted parts E St of all the servers in S t , all but one are protected by a key of Server t by Line 14 of Algorithm 5. (b) holds similar to (13) because |S t |= (r − 1)(q + 1) + (T − r)q = l − 1 by (6). • Assume r < t T − v. We have
where (a) holds for some j ∈ N Plain + 1, k and (s(i)) i∈It ∈ N Plain + 1, k |It| as follows. Note indeed that Server t stores |I t |= u + 1 keys, and all the other severs store (T −v)x+(r−T +v−1)(x−1)+(T −r)x = u + 2 (by (14)) encrypted parts of F , hence, considering the encrypted parts E St of all the servers in S t , all but one are protected by a key of Server t by Line 14 of Algorithm 5. (b) holds similar to (13) because |S t |= (r − 1)(q + 1) + (T − r)q = l − 1 by (6).
• Assume t T − v + 1. We have
where (a) holds for some (s(i)) i∈It ∈ N Plain + 1, k |It| as follows. Note indeed that Server t stores |I t |= u + 1 keys, and all the other severs store (T − v)x + (r − T + v)(x − 1) + (T − r − 1)x = 1 + u (by (11)) encrypted parts of F . Hence, all the encrypted parts E St of all the servers in S t are protected by a key of Server t by Line 14 of Algorithm 4. (b) holds similar to (13) because |S t |= r(q + 1) + (T − r − 1)q = l by (8) .
